

A Dialectical Account of Development and the Future of Liberalism in Africa

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Introduction

The burial of Kenyan lawyer S. M. Otieno in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the cause of intense controversy, both national and international. After Otieno's death, a legal battle ensued between the Luo tribe, whose traditions dictate the burial of Otieno on tribal grounds, and Otieno's wife and children, who endeavored to enforce Otieno's explicit wishes to be buried on his family farm. The tug-of-war between Otieno's body became an allegory for the internal struggle that afflicts many Kenyans: the tension between tradition and modernity. Indeed, Albert J. Paolini describes the situation as one that “brought to the fore anxieties and ambivalences at the nub of contemporary African identity ... centered around competing representations of identity between nationalist conceptions and tribal loyalties” (Paolini, 1999: 2).

Otieno's wife and children were accustomed to Western ideals, his feminist wife and children living in Nairobi, estranged from the tribal loyalties that would challenge Otieno's burial. Otieno's son testified during the court hearings that he “[did] not think of [him]self as one tribe or the other” and that he was in a “superior (perhaps even non-existent) category: the non-tribal African” (Harden 1991-2: 33). Though Otieno himself had renounced his membership to the Luo tribe, they would not allow his wife and children to undermine his ancestry. Eventually, the case was decided in favor of tribal tradition though it was quite evident that Kenyan President Daniel Moi manipulated the results, as it was politically safer to overrule a small family instead of an entire tribe (Paolini, 1999: 3). Though the Luo tribe claimed victory in the Otieno case, it inspired Africans to contemplate the role of tradition in African society and recognize the consequences of the unresolved conflict between it and modernity. Justice S.E.O. Bosire, who ruled in the Otieno case, acknowledged that eventually Africa would have to adopt modern values, commenting that “The time will come and are soon coming when circumstances will

dictate that the Luo customs ... be abandoned”; but he also imputes that though “change is inevitable ... it must be gradual.”¹

While it remains unclear whether Africa will be able to fully adopt modernity, Justice Bosire was indeed correct that the change must be gradual. Liberalism, which constitutes modernity at least partially if not wholly, has been attempted throughout Africa but has proven unsuitable for the region precisely because the change was not gradual, but rather coerced and sudden. The liberal tenants of free markets, democratization, and institutionalization that Kant originally denoted have largely been either rejected by African states or, more commonly, proven to be ineffective in improving the dire situation throughout the continent, precluding Africa from making the advances necessary to join the modern world. According to the Failed States Index, only three African states – South Africa, Botswana, and Ghana – are borderline stable countries, nine are considered “in danger”, and the remaining forty-two states are in “critical” condition (Fund for Peace, 2012). Moreover, the top five failed states and fifteen out of the top twenty are African (ibid). As free markets, democratization, and institutionalization are purported to be the pathway to peace, it is extremely troubling that it has proven to be ineffective and unsustainable throughout the continent, in spite of African efforts.

Whether or not the three elements of liberalism accurately assess the sources of peace is of little concern in this paper, as I am only concerned with its application to Africa. For the purposes of my argument, I will assume that it is indeed accurate that free markets, democratization, and institutionalization produce or at least contribute to peace. With this assumption in mind, and with the commonsense assumption that we should move toward a peaceful world, then it would logically follow that Africa should adopt liberalism in its entirety.

That the assumed pathway to peace has proven so insufficient and unmaintainable in

1 As quoted in Harden, 1991: 36.

Africa is perplexing. Why is it that although Africa has been reigned into the Kantian triad and attempted to incorporate its three elements, it has, in the worst case, completely dissolved regimes as in the case of Somalia, and in the best case, lagged in mitigating the devastating adversity that permeates African society? In order to answer this question, we must ask another: what is distinct about Africa that prevents the success of liberalism there?

Throughout this paper, I will focus my analysis on sub-Saharan African states, as the northern states of Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Morocco have had experiences distinct from the rest of Africa due to their distinct history from the rest of Africa and their grouping in the Middle East. Similarly, I exclude the island countries of Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Sao Tome, and Seychelles, as Jeffrey Herbst notes that land boundaries have a significant impact the development of states which differentiates island states from those on the mainland (Herbst, 2000: 5). Similarly, I exclude South Africa and Namibia due to their unique history of apartheid, creating an entirely different trajectory for the two states and preempting the attempted transition to liberalism made my other sub-Saharan countries.

To be clear, mine is an inquiry not into the flaws of liberalism – indeed, there is not enough space here to address the multitude of possible responses to that inquiry – but instead a question of which characteristics of sub-Saharan Africa keep liberalism from proving as durable as is evidenced in the West. It may be argued that the reason liberalism is more unsustainable in Africa than in their Western counterparts is because most African nations have not adopted *real* liberalism, but rather a straw-man version of it which does not reflect the true nature of liberalism. Perhaps this alleged pseudo-liberalism is caused by corruption, a lack of resources, or the need to satisfy basic needs before adopting socially compassionate policies, among numerous possible explanations. If we momentarily assume that pseudo-liberalism does exist in

place of genuine liberalism in Africa, then the central question is why Africa has been seemingly unable to adopt liberalism in its pure form, which would still require us to identify the characteristics that distinguish Africa from successful liberal states. So, I will set aside the concern that pseudo-liberalism is the true culprit in Africa, because even if it is, we still must wonder why African states have had a unique and unenviable experience with liberalism.

An under-utilized dialectical account of development could very well provide valuable insight into this perplexity. Originating with Hegel's dialectical method and elaborated upon by socialist scholars, the three laws of dialectical development seeks to explain the process that leads to transitions in the qualitative condition of every changing being. While Marxist philosophers applied Hegel's process of development to the class struggle and numerous other scholars have applied it to other scientific phenomena, it has to my knowledge never been used to explain the process of change in Africa though it is capable of providing intuitively and empirically sound claims on the problems that undermine stability across the sub-Saharan region. While I utilize Hegel's account of development to navigate these problems, I should make it clear that I do not seek to prove the inarguable accuracy of the laws of dialectical development. At the very most, the laws of dialectical development are indeed completely indicative of the process of change, but even at the very least, these laws can still provide a new lens through which to view the situation in Africa.

Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to provide insight into the question of why Africa has seen little success in liberalism as opposed to Europe, looking through the scope of Hegel's dialectical account of development to do so. First, I will explain the dialectical account of development and the three laws that accompany it. I will then apply these laws to each of the three legs of liberalism, after more clearly defining them, to illustrate that Africa skipped steps in

the natural dialectical process of development which facilitated the transition to liberalism for successful European states. Finally, I assess the future of liberalism in Africa, maintaining that without significant quantitative changes in state size, wealth, or power, sub-Saharan Africa will remain unable to sustain liberalism and reap its benefits.

A Dialectical Account of Development

The basis of for the dialectical account of development was provided by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel in *The Science of Logic*, first published in several volumes throughout the 1810s. Philosophizing change and development in thought, Hegel purports in his series that development of consciousness involves a process in which internal opposites contradict one another and collide until inevitably one opposite grows powerful enough to eliminate the contradiction. The development in thought that results from this process is, according to Hegel, what creates development in nature and human society. His dialectical account of development (dialectical because it follows the same general pattern as his famous dialectic: the presentation of a thesis, followed by an antithesis, and finally a synthesis) is also idealistic, as primacy is placed on consciousness rather than the material world. That is, according to Hegel, consciousness shapes history and the material world: an idealistic view largely unwelcome by most socialists, who generally claim that the material world shapes consciousness. Indeed, Marx himself proclaims this materialist objection to Hegel's account of development, noting that for Hegel, “the process of thinking ... is the creator of the real world, and the real world is only the external appearance of the idea. With me, the reverse is true” (Marx, 1890: lvii). Frederick Engels, a socialist contemporary of Marx, was one of the first and most thorough scholars who attempted to introduce materialism to Hegel's dialectical theory of development.

In an attempt to displace Hegel's idealism with materialism, Engels writes *Dialectics of Nature*, in which he synthesizes Hegel's multi-volume series to three laws of dialectical development and relates those laws to nature and history in a more materialist manner. Having defended Hegel's dialectical view of development several years earlier in *Anti-Dühring*, Engels identifies three Hegelian laws of development based on *The Science of Logic*: 1) the law of

passage of quantitative change into qualitative change, 2) the law of unity and conflict of opposites, and 3) the law of the negation of the negation, which relates the laws and is integral in the dialectical structure of development.

While Engels supports Hegel's three laws, he notes that “the mistake lies in the fact that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not deduced from them”, and that the objective world outside of the mind shapes the subjective world inside the mind (Engels, 1940a: 26). Furthermore, Engels goes on to assert that Hegel's laws can be better used in application to the material world because change can be more easily observed and measured, rather than asserted without empirical validation. It is in the context of the material world that Hegel's laws seem “not only quite rational but even rather obvious” (ibid: 27). If, as Engels claims, the development of the material world shapes that of the consciousness, and Hegel's laws are muddled by immeasurability in the subjective, then Hegel's laws simply need be refocused on the objective and the observable. In doing so, dialectical materialism was born as a philosophy of development and most notably as an agent for Marxism, as Marx, Engels, Stalin, and Mao Tse-Tung, among others, used it primarily to explain how economic systems like capitalism would reach a maximum efficiency, develop internal contradictions, and collapse. But, in doing so, they also established the applicability of Hegel's dialectical theory of development to the scientific study of the world which would be expanded upon by later scholars.

In his successful attempt at introducing materialism to Hegel's laws of development, Engels goes on to explain the first law of the passage of quantitative changes into qualitative changes and relate it to measurable phenomena. In Engels' words, this law proclaims that “qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (or so-called energy)” (Engels 1940a: 26). That is, quantitative change ensues up to a

point at which a qualitative change occurs, and this is the process that governs the development of the natural world. A common and basic example of boiling water exemplifies this law. If a pot of water is put on the stove at 40 degrees Celsius, a one-degree, five-degree, or ten-degree change in temperature will not cause any qualitative change in the water; the pot is still filled with liquid water, albeit warmer liquid water. However, after a certain amount of quantitative temperature changes to the water, somewhere around 100 degrees Celsius it will undergo a qualitative change, turning from liquid water to steam. As Engels notes, this law is applicable also in the fields of chemistry, physics, and biology, as the addition or subtraction of atoms, the transfer of motion, and nutritional intake are also quantitative changes that inevitably lead to qualitative change.

Though Engels cites examples mostly from the “exact sciences, since here the quantities are accurately measurable and traceable”, he also extends Hegel's first law to the social sciences, expounding that “in biology, as in the history of human society, the same law holds good at every step” (ibid: 33). Accordingly, he applies the first law to explain the experience of Napoleon Bonaparte during the battle between his cavalrymen and the Mameluke horsemen of Egypt, in which Napoleon “describes the conflicts between the French cavalry, bad riders but disciplined, with the Mamelukes, as regards single combat were better horsemen but undisciplined, as follows – 'Two Mamelukes were a match for three Frenchmen, 100 Mamelukes were equal to 100 Frenchmen, 300 Frenchmen could beat 300 Mamelukes, and 1,000 Frenchmen invariably defeated 1,500 Mamelukes’” (Engels, 1907: 158-9). Respecting the fact that the Frenchmen and Mamelukes had different strengths, Engels goes on to explain that quantitative changes in the number of French and Mameluke cavalrymen alter the qualitative change that occurs as a result, namely the loss or victory of either side. Marx also reinforces the applicability of this law in

society, citing the middle ages' strict limits on the amount of laborers employed under one trade-master so as to prevent any master from controlling their market (Marx, 1890: 836). These decision-makers embraced the logic of Hegel's first law that quantitative changes in wealth or power over labor would eventually facilitate a qualitative change into another market form, like capitalism.

Scholars have applied Hegel's law of the passage of quantitative changes into qualitative changes to other spheres of science, like anthropology. Leslie A. White, for example, posits that the uniquely human ability to symbolize, leading to language and culture, developed as a result of growth in brain size. Thus, quantitative changes in the size of the brain eventually led humankind to the nodal point at which humans became able to symbolize information and convey that information to others intersubjectively (White, 1949: 32-33). Years later, Maria Titiev corroborates White's assertion, noting that “a primate brain, which is normally less than 900 cc, stands for a mentality that is incapable of true symbolization; ... [but] any normal primate brain above 1,000 cc is probably fully capable of using symbolic speech and other features of algebraic mentality” (Titiev, 1954: 160). As both scholars observe, the cellular and chemical makeup of the human brain is identical to that of other high primates; there is nothing structurally or chemically unique about the human brain except its size. Given this information, Hegel's first law provides an extremely relevant explanation for the evolution of human language and culture: the quantitative difference in brain size qualitatively differentiates humans from other high primates.

More recently, Robert Carneiro also applied the first law of development to anthropology, but in a social rather than biological sense. He proposes that in human society, the quantitative change with the highest potential for causing qualitative change in the societal structure is

population growth. According to Carneiro, when the population of an autonomous society without an official overarching authority reaches a certain nodal point (which, he notes, is unique to each society), the society will either break apart or alter its social structure to mitigate the consequences of population growth, like increased violence, scarcity of resources, and overall tension within the group (Carneiro, 2000: 12928). He cites the structural patterns of the Indians of the North American Plains as evidence of his assertion. The members of Plains tribes numbered around 50 throughout most of the year, and during this time, there was little to no social structure guiding the tribe; typically, there would be one headman for each tribe, who served mostly as a figurehead and provided little structure to the group. However, when the Plains tribes would convene to hunt buffalo in the summer, the population of the hunting group would often exceed 1,200, necessitating a new, stronger social structure to prevent violence and tension within the group. During buffalo season, the Plains tribes saw the formation of a council of tribe leaders who chose a tribal chief, a “men's society” which served the council of tribe leaders, a police force, and an organizational committee for their annual Sun Dance ceremony. Carneiro asserts that “the emergence of these structural features was a response to the organizational problems posed by supraband aggregation ... shown by the fact that every one of them—the tribal chief, the council, the men's societies, the police force, the sun dance organization—lapsed when the tribe broke up into its constituent units in the fall” (Carneiro, 1967: 238). His example provides further empirical evidence of quantitative change leading to qualitative change within society, and his unique application of population growth to societal organization is one to which I will return later in my analysis of Africa.

Though the law of passage of quantitative changes into qualitative changes may seem clear now that it has been exemplified in several academic strata, it may be as of yet unclear how

quantitative changes occur and how they reach the nodal point at which they become a qualitative change. Put differently, how do measurable changes happen to x such that it reaches a point at which its very nature changes? Is it not possible that change happens as a result of extraneous events, or even randomly?

To answer these questions, I now turn to Hegel's second law in his dialectical account of development: the law of unity and conflict of opposites. This law postulates that within everything, there exists a contradiction between two opposites that clash and cause internal tension. That is, in the context of Hegel's work, consciousness is full of opposites – being and becoming, the negative and the positive, the moral and the immoral, etc. – and is innately contradictory. Often regarded as the spine of dialectics, Hegel himself notes that “grasping opposites in their unity, or the positive in the negative ... is the most important aspect of the dialectic” (Hegel, 2010: 35). Though Hegel uses this premise only to address the development of consciousness in *The Science of Logic*, his socialist successors would defend this law in terms of the material world.

We can return to Engels for this defense, being one of the strongest advocates for the dialectical theory of development. In *Anti-Dühring*, written specifically to defend Hegel's laws against Eugen Dühring, who attempted to displace Marxism with a new strand of socialism divorced completely from the former, Engels addresses Dühring's critique of Hegel's second law. Dühring, among others, was concerned that contradiction can only appertain to thought and consciousness in which everything is subjective, but not to reality, where contradictions are absurd and cannot exist within one being. Indeed, Dühring acknowledges that “the antagonism of forces measured against each other and moving in opposite directions is in fact the basic form of all actions in the life of the world and its creatures ... But this opposition of the directions

taken by the forces of elements and individuals does not in the slightest degree coincide with the idea of absurd contradictions” (Dühring, 2010: 31). Engels admits that in the lifeless and the motionless, Dühring is correct that contradictions are not necessarily present. However, in all that is living, moving, or changing, internal contradiction is necessary in order to continue doing so. For example, Engels looks at physical motion to clarify contradiction. Movement itself is a contradiction, as it requires that x be in y place at z time, while also being in q place at z time. That is, movement requires a change between motionlessness and motion, and a change of position. How does one undertake the task of movement if it is motionless and has no capacity to move? Even Dühring himself validates that “there is no bridge whatever in rational mechanics from the strictly static to the dynamic” (Dühring, 2010: 80). There *must*, therefore, exist a contradiction, albeit perhaps only a momentary one, between motionlessness and motion whenever movement occurs. As Engels eloquently states, “in asserting the incomprehensibility of motion, [Dühring] admits against [his] will the existence of this contradiction, and thus admits the objective presence in things and processes themselves of a contradiction which is moreover an actual force” (Engels, 1877).

Engels goes on to purport that life is, in essence, a contradiction, and this contradiction is necessary. Due to constant change in every living thing, “a being is at each moment itself and yet something else”, and “as soon as the contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to an end, and death steps in” (ibid). This contradiction, to Engel and his contemporaries, is what animates living creatures and drives development. Stalin also elaborated upon the inherent contradictions within life itself, expounding that the living world is in “a state of continuous movement and change, of continuous renewal and development, where something is always arising and developing, and something always disintegrating and dying away” (Stalin, 1938: 2).

In addition to Engels' application of the law of unity and conflict of opposites to physical motion, many other examples have been cited to demonstrate the versatility of this law in relation to various sciences. However, it is important to note, as Mao Tse-Tung does in his insightful analysis *On Contradiction*, that while contradiction is universal in the sense that it resides in every living being, the nature and intensity of contradiction within a being is not universal; rather, all things have their own unique contradiction which gives qualitative character to those things (Mao, 1937). The particularity of contradictions can best be summarized in Mao's own words:

“Every form of motion contains within itself its own particular contradiction. This particular contradiction constitutes the particular essence which distinguishes one thing from another. It is the internal cause or, as it may be called, the basis for the immense variety of things in the world. There are many forms of motion in nature, mechanical motion, sound, light, heat, electricity, dissociation, combination, and so on. All these forms are interdependent, but in its essence each is different from the others. The particular essence of each form of motion is determined by its own particular contradiction. This holds true not only for nature but also for social and ideological phenomena. Every form of society, every form of ideology, has its own particular contradiction and particular essence.”

— Mao Tse-Tung, *On Contradiction*

In Mao's view, then, it is impossible to devise a template for contradiction within beings, but it can be resolutely confirmed that contradiction does exist in every living thing.

With this in mind, examples of contradiction are discernible everywhere. The attraction between protons and electrons presents a micro-scale contradiction within the atom, as the positively charged protons cling to the negatively charged electrons. If this contradiction were to resolve itself through the neutralization of protons and electrons, then the atom would dissolve, as there would be no force keeping it whole. Similarly, Maurice Cornforth notes that relations

between living organisms and nature is inherently contradictory, as nature provides the means of life to living creatures while at the same time posing lethal threats to those creatures. Cornforth goes on to elaborate upon humankind's unique relationship with nature, advancing that we live by means of nature while at the same time attempting to subdue it and bend it to our will (Cornforth, 1953: 97).

Not surprisingly, another practical application of this law popular amongst socialists is the contradiction that dwells within capitalist society. Marx, for example, explicates the absurdity of increasing production. If production is boosted to higher levels, that means the workers who produce those goods, and society as a whole, will be able to buy a smaller proportion of the products. The only people who will be able to increase their proportion of goods in the economy are the capitalist executives that reap the benefits of increased production. If production is increased via the displacement of workers with machinery, then this contradiction is especially apparent since not only can workers buy a lesser proportion of goods, but they have less money with which to purchase goods, decreasing their share of products even further (Marx, 1890: 1228-9).

If Marx and his contemporaries are correct in asserting that meaningful contradictions inhabit every living and changing being, then it may seem as though the world is in a perpetual and inescapable tug-of-war between a multitude of internal opposites. However, Hegel's third law, the negation of the negation, explains how the first two laws of dialectical development lead to change in nature and society. The law of the negation of the negation specifies that internal contradictions eventually tip to one side or the other through quantitative change and resolve themselves through a qualitative negation of the thing's former state. After a given amount of time and experience, new contradictions arise within this negation and the process repeats itself.

So, eventually, the negation and its former state are sublated into a synthesis of the two: the negation of the negation, which is qualitatively different than the thing's original state and its negation, but which incorporates elements of both. This law, which directly reflects Hegel's dialectical method of a thesis followed by an antithesis concluded with a synthesis, is integral in Hegel's dialectical account of development. Without the resolution of contradiction through quantitative change, his account would be one of the natural condition and not development.

Though it may seem an abstract concept, Engels shows its explanatory power by citing several instances in which this law directly applies to nature and society. For example, if a grain of barley is dropped in soil and submitted to the appropriate conditions, it will grow into a barley plant, negating its former grain state. As this plant grows and flowers, it produces more grain and dies, negating the negation of grain to plant and returning to its former state of grain. However, it is not the barley's entirely original state to which it returns; rather, as the barley is reproduced it becomes qualitatively improved, as its grain becomes more fertile and spurs higher grain production in the plant. So, upon repeating the negation of the negation pattern, the grain of barley is positively altered and never returns to its entirely original state (Engels, 1877). There are numerous examples of this occurrence throughout nature, another being the development of butterflies (which are representative of a majority of the insect world). The butterfly grows within an egg, and negates its egg form when it hatches. As it matures, it eventually pairs with another butterfly and produces eggs of its own, dying as soon as the female has laid its eggs, which negates the negation of the egg. The process is repeated and with every butterfly death, an entirely new and distinct butterfly is created which will follow the same pattern and give rise to another (ibid). Similarly, one can turn to geology for a different manifestation of this law. The top strata of the earth's surface is, over millions of years, eroded

by atmospheric and environmental conditions, giving way for the lower, liquid layers of the earth to cool and rise to the surface. The original top layer is negated, and eventually the negation is negated through the same forces that eroded all the previous layers of the earth's surface. The result is chemically diverse soil which can accommodate an abundance of widely varied plants (ibid). Engels also applied Hegel's third law to governmental leadership, citing that force keeps despots in their positions, but is also the cause of their inevitable fall from power. This contradiction works itself out as the despot is overthrown, and the inequality that was present under him is replaced with equality. Over time, another despot will return to power, and the process will repeat itself as society evolves (ibid).

Hegel's dialectical laws can be directly applied to natural events in every realm of the living world in order to make sense of the complex process of development. Governance is no exception, as it is perpetually changing like the people that comprise it. I will now use Hegel's dialectical account of development as an analytical framework through which to diagnose liberalism's unsuitability for Africa.

A Dialectical Account of African Liberalism

In this section, I will apply the three laws of dialectical development to liberalism in Africa, assessing the causes of its insufficiency in accordance with Hegel's viewpoint. The dialectical account of development is one that has rarely, if ever, been applied directly to governance in Africa, though it has an extremely high capacity to explain the situation in the region. Not only can it explain the lack of legitimate governance in Africa, but it also proves to be an intuitively accurate explanation for why liberalism has failed throughout the continent.

The Kantian Triad

Traditional Kantian liberalism, which blossomed into the ideology that guides the Western world, puts forth three cornerstones of peace and prosperity: democratization, institutionalization, and free markets. Allegedly, it is under these three conditions the world will experience the perpetual peace that Kant so famously denoted (Kant, 1795).

According to the democratic peace theory, democracies are more pacific toward one another, so if the entire world were to democratize, then war would be no longer. The type of democracy that liberals are referring to are democracies that have market economies with private property rights, policies that are internally sovereign, representative government, juridical rights for its citizens, and at least 30% total suffrage (Doyle, 1983: 207-8). Democratization is thought to bring about peace for several reasons. It creates checks on governmental power so that states cannot choose to go to war without public consent, and the members of the government are generally well-versed in settling disputes via argumentation rather than violence. Accordingly, democracies view other democracies as non-threatening. While the democratic peace theory has been challenged repeatedly (Small & Singer, 1976; Layne, 1994; Gowa, 1999; Rosato, 2003), it remains an integral element of peace and prosperity according to liberals.

Institutionalization is also essential to the Kantian triad. The development of transnational institutions allegedly reduces the possibility of war through several mechanisms, the most important being increased transparency, reputational and tangible consequences, and dialogue. When states participate in an institution, that institution makes information visible to all member states, decreasing the uncertainty that plays a major role in war according to realists. In addition to increased information, institutions also issue punishments for a state's abuse of the agreements. This can take the form of damage to a state's reputation, thereby discouraging other states from engaging in agreements with the perpetrator, or tangible punishment like sanctions or dismissal from the institution. Finally, liberals assert that member states have a higher propensity for reaching agreements peacefully through dialogue since they have an unbiased forum in which to conduct discussions. In summary, institutions are thought to act as an arbiter in an otherwise anarchic world.

Finally, free markets are the third leg of liberal peace and stability. Free markets are thought to increase economic interdependence through trade and transnational commerce, which serves as the primary mechanism for the reduction of war. Norman Angell alleges that free markets decrease the possibility of war by making it unprofitable. He claims that if a state, no matter how wealthy, engages in war, then it will suffer immense financial consequences which serve as a deterrent. Even if the state has wealth to spare, it will still suffer relative to states that do not engage in war (Angell, 1910). Similarly, Gartzke notes that free markets are fifty times more conducive to peace than democracy (Gartzke, 2005: 35).

Skippping Steps in the Dialectic

I. Trade and the African Economy

In the coming pages, I attempt to show that free markets have for the most part failed

Africa because Europe hindered it from completing the necessary cycle of development dictated by Hegel's three laws. My analysis is heavily concerned with the precolonial period, as it was during this period that most of Western Europe transitioned from feudalism to capitalism, which can be equated with the Kantian notion of free markets. Europe's full embrace of capitalism was a product of their economic exploitation of Africa, especially due to the slave trade, and made impossible the quantitative growth in wealth that drove Europe to the qualitative change to capitalism. This transition to capitalism subsequently provided the wealth necessary to facilitate the Industrial Revolution throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century to the further detriment of African markets, which did not have the financial resources to industrialize. As Europe manipulated and systematically suppressed the trade of African goods, they inserted in its place foreign goods upon which Africa became dependent.

African dependence on foreign commodities, especially from Europe, is validated in dependency theory and world-systems theory, though both are becoming more unpopular with the rise of globalization theory (Gilpin, 2001). Nonetheless, the second law of unity and conflict of opposites directly applies to the African dependence on European goods which endured through the pre-, colonial, and post-colonial periods into the present. As the law dictates, in every changing thing, there exists a contradiction which must be resolved before progress can be made. In the African economy, this contradiction takes the form of a struggle between the need for foreign commodities in an underproductive and uncompetitive market and the desire for freedom from the grasp of Western exploitation. In other words, the European exploitation of the African economy during the precolonial period and beyond is perpetuated by the continual import of European goods, while on the other hand, African markets must continue to import European products since most markets in the region lack the technology, specialization, or

resources to produce commodities at a quick enough pace to compete in the world economy. Let us look return to and examine more closely the slave trade as a mechanism for growth in the European market and stagnation in that of Africa.

The slave trade was instituted by Europeans around 1445 to bring labor to the New World, where captive indigenous populations, who were forced to work on the newly installed plantations, had dwindled with the introduction of European diseases. Lacking a large body of healthy, young laborers, Europe turned to Africa, most notably the western coastline, in order to accumulate wealth and power across the globe. Exact estimates of how many Africans were captured as slaves or killed in the process of capture are unavailable, given the duration and scale of the slave trade. However, calculated estimates asseverate that four million slaves were transported across the Indian Ocean (M'Bokolo, 1995: 264), an additional four million across the Red Sea (Austen, 1987: 265), up to nine million via the trans-Saharan caravan route (Inikori, 1982), and anywhere from eleven to twenty million across the Atlantic Ocean (Curtin, 1969)². Given these mind-boggling figures, an exact number need not be calculated to comprehend the devastating effects that this immense population loss had on African socio-economic development.

The main effect that the slave trade had on African development is the detrimental loss of a significant portion of the labor force. Since Europeans wanted able-bodied slaves, they almost exclusively captured men and women between the ages of 15 and 35, with a ratio of two men to every woman (Rodney, 1973: 141). Often times, Europeans would take young children in order to get them accustomed at an early age to the services that would be expected of them for the rest of their lives. This means that a significant portion of capable laborers was removed from Africa, stifling their agricultural and industrial development in relation to Europe, who reaped all

2 Figures cited in M'Bokolo, 1998: 1.

the developmental benefits of the trade.

Another negative economic consequence of the slave trade is the supplanting of European goods for African goods. This took several forms. Commonly, Europeans would bribe the tribal or regional leadership into forfeiting some of his subjects in exchange for commodities. Most often, African leaders had no way of defending themselves against the Europeans, and with the realization that their subjects would be captured either by force or through trade, African decision-makers had little choice but to accept the European goods to mitigate the loss of labor and subsequent drop in productive capacity. In Upper Guinea and the Cape Verde islands, the Portuguese engaged in this exact behavior. Some of the items traded to the Africans in these regions were cotton, dyes, and salt, all in order to “fill the holds of slave ships” (Rodney, 1973: 96). As military technology improved within Europe and it became apparent that the Africans were no match for the growing powerhouses, bribery for slaves became a thing of the past and Europe instead forged its way directly into the African economy. It did so using several methods.

One of the most common ways for Europeans to use the African economy to their advantage was to become middlemen for intracontinental trade. One striking example of the effect that this had on the African economy can be seen in trade along the Gold Coast from the 15th century until colonization. The Portuguese are once again the culprits in this instance, having planted a trading post at Axim, near Cape Three Points, located directly between the Ivory Coast and off the shore of the Ghanaian port of Accra. The post at Axim originally served as a convenient station through which to conduct gold trade with Ghana and buy African goods to resell, but it metamorphosed into a trade barrier between Ghana and the Ivory Coast. Having a strong relationship, traders from the Ivory Coast would sail past Axim to trade their products at

the port of Accra. In an ultimately successful attempt at isolating the two regions from one another, the Portuguese prohibited Ivory Coast traders from sailing past Axim, thus preventing them from their engagements in Accra. Not only did they ban Ivoirians from the area surrounding Axim, but they also forbade residents of Axim from traveling to the Ivory Coast so as to preclude all trade in the region (Rodney, 1973: 94-6).

To illustrate that the hindrance of the African economy was a goal not just of the Portuguese but of most European powers present in the region, the Dutch engaged in equally asphyxiating policies. When they gained control of the trading post at Axim in 1637, they found that African merchants, in spite of having their lives threatened, were smuggling goods from the Ivory Coast to Ghana and vice versa. Realizing that they could not completely halt trade in the region, they insisted that traders traveling in the region must carry with them Dutch goods worth at least 4 ounces of gold to trade alongside their own products (ibid: 95-6).

The intentional stifling of intracontinental trade characterized European endeavors throughout their precolonial tenure, as can also be seen in the textile industry in the region. Before the slave trade commenced, Africa and India were among the world's top cloth producers. When the Europeans initiated slavery, they began buying cloth in extremely large quantities from India and Africa in order to resell it to one another at higher prices. With a shortage of labor necessary to engage in the time-consuming and intricate process of making cloth, Africans could not match the pace at which Europeans were buying their textiles in order to meet the demand within Africa. As John Thornton notes, “these inefficiencies created a market for foreign goods that ambitious rulers could tap for slaves to sell to foreigners or to build up their own followings, thus promoting further dependency as well as undermining local industry” (Thornton, 1990: 3). The Euro-drain on African cloth perfectly characterizes the contradiction that inhabits the

African economy: the contradiction between unwelcome reliance on European goods, and the need for but inability to produce many commodities.

According to Hegel's dialectical account of development, the deprivation of wealth that Europeans induced on Africa prevented it from following the natural path of quantitative growth that would eventually lead to a qualitative change from feudalism to capitalism. Instead, Africa was forced to adopt capitalism in spite of the fact that it was an unnatural transition in which Africa never saw the advantage. Now, and extending back to the precolonial era of the slave trade, African dependence on foreign goods and the contradiction within that dependence that seems somewhat insurmountable has prevented the region from accumulation of wealth, or at least enough accumulation to facilitate the success of capitalism in African states.

II. Societal Organization and Political Power

In this section, I focus mostly on the colonial period of European occupation in Africa and the subsequent transfer of power back to the African people, as it is this time period that instigated a history of political instability in Africa which extends to the present day. I assert, in accordance with Jeffrey Herbst's analysis of political instability in Africa, that the liberal nation-state has proven unsustainable in the region due to the arbitrary boundaries that were drawn up by European nations and the subsequent reinforcement of these boundaries after African independence. Applying this claim to Hegel's first law of the passage of quantitative into qualitative change, it can be observed that, similar to the case of the economy, Africa was forced to adopt a qualitatively new form of governance, though they never experienced the quantitative change in population necessary to facilitate that transition. The precolonial period of slave trade further reduced the population of already sparsely-populated regions, and these regions were integrated into the colonial state but remained outside the confines of the political extension of

power. Since the European powers were unable to extend their political authority over their entire state due to the uneven population distribution, and since the subsequently independent African regimes adopted the colonial boundaries in spite of this fact, these thinly populated areas still remain outside the realm of political power. What we find, then, is that in order for a healthy, liberal nation-state to have been implemented in Africa, a specific quantitative change would have been necessary: a decrease in the size of states, which would allow full political authority over a smaller area, or an increase in the resources that would allow the state to extend its power.

As Jeffrey Herbst aptly notes, “In the precolonial period, boundaries were formed according to how far a state could extend its power ... [but] the fundamental change that colonialism wrought was to forge a system of territorial boundaries that ... no longer reflected how far power *could* be broadcast but rather, how far leaders believed their power *should* extend” (Herbst, 2000: 252, emphasis added). This unenviable situation in Africa speaks to Hegel's second law of the unity and conflict of opposites, as politics in the region presents a contradiction between the desire for rigid state boundaries in order to reinforce state control and the ineffectiveness of state control due to those concrete boundaries. In other words, the reason that African governments adopted the colonial boundaries is because they had been firmly established by the colonial powers and would ensure that African governments could maintain control by resisting encroachment upon these boundaries by another state; however, since these boundaries were an inaccurate reflection of how far the state could extend its power, the adoption of them weakens governmental authority or at least precludes its increase. Accordingly, the African adoption of these boundaries led to the current predicament in which “the well-defined and consequential boundaries created are no longer a good mirror of state power, which tends to

continue to be fractured, weak, and contested” (ibid).

Until political stability and legitimacy is formed within African states, the liberal norm of individual and minority rights cannot fully be exercised. Several scholars have indicated that many African states are still in the stage of state-building, but they are not afforded the natural process of state-building, characterized by the provision of basic needs to the entire population followed by a protection of human rights, through which Europe built its states (Rokkan, 1975; Weiner, 1995; Ayoob, 1998) . Mohammed Ayoob cites several related contradictions regarding the international expectations of African states:

“The workings of the international system, now more securely established than in the sixteenth or seventeenth century with a well-developed set of norms ... have also made the task of Third World state-makers infinitely more difficult than was the case with their counterparts in early modern Europe. The contradictory demands placed on Third World states by international norms, which require them to be both effective as well as humane in their treatment of their populations (both individuals and groups), have left many of them in a perpetual state of schizophrenia. Furthermore, the Third World states' lack of effective control over their economic resources in the context of an international division of labor that perpetuates dependency ... and detracts from their sovereignty has put the legitimacy of their political orders in grave jeopardy ... [Furthermore,] the sustained policy of the major powers (witnessed very early during the Cold War) of exporting their conflicts to the periphery in order to preserve stability at the core of the system in the nuclear era, has had extremely deleterious effects on the state-building enterprise in the Third World.”

— Mohammed Ayoob, 1998: 44.

These contradictory actions and demands forced upon Africa have indeed further alienated the continent from a pattern of healthy, liberal state-building and political development similar to the process that Europe endured.

Examples of the political instability caused by the lack of quantitative changes in state size are observable throughout Africa. A prime illustration of this can be found in the

Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC). The DROC is the largest sub-Saharan state that is included in my analysis, occupying over two million square kilometers. Its population, however, has a uneven distribution that disallows state power to be adequately exerted on the entire society. The places with the highest population density are almost exclusively on the borders of the DROC, which makes the extension of power extremely difficult because of the relatively empty interior of the country (NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center, 2000). Furthermore, due to the unusually large size of the DROC relative to other states, the process of extending political authority over the entire country would prove especially difficult as it would necessitate a large pool of resources with which to create roads, trains, and local governmental centers in order to effectively exert its power (Herbst, 2000: 147). On the other hand, France, which has a population only two million less than the DROC, is only around a quarter of the size of the DROC, which means, not surprisingly, that the government of France can easily exert its control over the entire population as the whole country is very densely populated and full of labor and resources to strengthen the state. The same problem of uneven population distribution is present in Ethiopia, where the densely population area is centered in the middle of the country. The state does not possess the resources to extend its power to the outer regions of the country, so the only part of the nation that is is allowed the authority and services of the state is the central, more densely populated part.

This lack of effective political control over all areas of African states exemplifies what Robert Jackson calls “quasi-states”. He uses the term “negative sovereignty” to describe these quasi-states, which “lack many of the marks and merits of empirical statehood postulated by positive sovereignty ... In short, they often appear to be juridical more than empirical entities” (Jackson, 1990: 1, 4). That is, these states claim the title of sovereign arbiters within the country,

but they lack the capability to provide the services and protection to the entire population that characterizes Western liberal democracies. Given that these quasi-states do not have total power over their dominion and cannot execute the elementary functions of a state, it seems unlikely that they will be able to incorporate the liberal elements of governance into their regimes. This returns us to the contradictory international demands on Africa that Ayoob cited, namely the expectation that African states will be “both effective as well as humane” in their governance (Ayoob, 1998: 4). Fareed Zakaria's account of illiberal democracy, which describes much of sub-Saharan Africa, is extremely applicable to this subject.

Zakaria observes that illiberal democracies are on the rise because many developing countries have succumbed to the Western ideal of democracy in lieu of its liberal counterpart. Indeed, he notes that since 1991, most of the 45 sub-Saharan states have carried out multi-party elections characteristic of democracy, with 18 sub-Saharan governments accomplishing this task in 1996 alone (Zakaria, 1997: 25). However, most of these states have failed to institute the liberal practices of complete human rights protection. Michael Chege similarly notes that Africa “overemphasized multiparty elections ... and correspondingly neglected the basic tenants of liberal governance”.³ This highlights the contradiction within the demand effective governance and the protection of human rights, and reasserts my point that most African governments are unable to adopt both a democratic and a liberal state.

In summary, the size of most sub-Saharan African states is entirely too large for the governments to assert effective control over sparse populations that are so unevenly distributed. In accordance with Hegel's first law, without a quantitative decrease in the expanse of state boundaries or an increase in the resources that are conducive to the extension of power in order allow a transition from quasi-statehood to modern statehood, it is unlikely that African regimes

3 As quoted in Zakaria, 1997: 4.

will be able to sufficiently incorporate the elements of liberal governance that are necessary to complete the Kantian triad. Furthermore, the struggle of opposites between effectiveness and the protection of human rights in the early stages of state-building is one that must be resolved in order for African governance to progress.

III. Institutionalization: International Organizations and Norms

While free markets and democratization have proven unsustainable in Africa, the case against institutionalization is not so clear-cut. International organizations have had both positive and negative consequences for sub-Saharan Africa, so it is difficult to certainly confirm their impact on the region. This is mostly due to the wide array of international organizations (IOs) that operate in Africa: international governmental organizations (IGOs) like the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like Oxfam or the Red Cross, and in both realms there are a plethora of economic, environmental, political, and humanitarian organizations. International norms will also be included in the category of institutions. Martha Finnemore best defines international norms as “a set of intersubjective understandings readily apparent to actors that makes behavioral claims on those actors” (Finnemore, 1994: 2)⁴. With that definition, norms function similarly to IGOs in that they promote certain principles which are punishable by the states that subscribe to them if another state defects from those norms. In this section, I will assert that most IGOs, or at least the most influential ones in the region which have a strong liberal backbone, and international norms have proven to be ineffective in Africa, despite their small and occasional victories, because they reassert the aforementioned liberal principles of capitalism and democratization which are unsustainable in the region. Furthermore, I exclude NGOs from my analysis of institutions. Though they may have had a positive influence in sub-Saharan Africa, this influence is marginal

4 As quoted in Florini, 1996: 364.

compared to IGOs and norms, as NGOs do not have the same coercive power or capacity to build as the former.

International governmental organizations in which Western states participate, most notably the World Bank, the IMF, and the UN, have been mostly unsuccessful in alleviating the problems that plague sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank and IMF have both come under harsh criticism for both their leadership, which is dominated by Western, wealthy states, and for its economic policies. Since the World Bank and IMF receive most of their funding from a handful of wealthy countries, which coincidentally are mostly Western liberal states, these countries comprise the leadership of the institution and their interests are almost exclusively represented in the policies that the World Bank enforces (Woods, 2007: 190). In the economic realm in which the World Bank and IMF operate, this enthusiasm for liberal principles manifests itself in the promotion of free markets. In the 1990s the World Bank and IMF formed the Washington Consensus which promoted the downscaling of government, deregulation, and privatization throughout the economy. The Consensus was met with harsh scrutiny, as the policies that reflected it were detrimental to developing countries, especially within sub-Saharan Africa. The structural adjustment programs (SAPs) of the 1980s and 1990s illustrate this point, as they were designed to provide financial aid to countries in economic trouble while adjusting the policies of the state, including a redistribution of government resources, changing exchange rates, encouraging production, as well as enforcing the three principles of the Washington Consensus. Barend DeVries notes that these policies were only successful in states that already had economies durable enough to sustain the changes implemented; but in most economies of sub-Saharan Africa, inflation, economic growth, and poverty all increased as a result of SAPs (DeVries, 1996: 69). This is not surprising, given that capitalist endeavors in Africa have proven

relatively unsuccessful since precolonial times when free markets were forced upon underdeveloped African economies rather than naturally adopted through Hegel's dialectical process of development. Though eventually SAPs were replaced in 1999 – albeit, only by the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers approach, which has been criticized as having the same flaws as SAPs – sub-Saharan Africa suffered almost two decades of detrimental economic policies which not only had deleterious effects on the economy but also reinforced African inferiority to and dependence on the West (Tan, 2007: 152; Chossudovsky, 1997). These effects of the World Bank and IMF's policies toward sub-Saharan Africa further delay the quantitative growth in wealth and the struggle between economic autonomy and stability that must be surpassed in order for African states to reap the benefits of capitalism.

The United Nations has also proven mostly ineffective in sub-Saharan Africa. While it has proven successful in other regions of the world, the UN has largely neglected or failed in its efforts in Africa. For example, the United Nations failed to intervene in or provide material assistance to mitigate the devastating effects of the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur, it neglected to carry out any action in the Second Congo War, and it abandoned Somalia in terms of peacekeeping forces and material assistance after the dissolution of its government in 1991. In its implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which are eight goals for development involving poverty, education, gender equality, child mortality rates, maternal health, disease, environmental sustainability, and a coordination of efforts in these areas, the UN mandated that .7% of developed countries' gross national income be devoted to the MDGs by 2015 (UN Millenium Project, 2007). However, many developed countries, including Australia and the United States, have failed to meet this goal, which exemplifies the inefficiency of the UN in coercing its member states to combat the struggles of sub-Saharan Africa (UN Millenium

Project, 2005). Furthermore, the UN, World Bank, and IMF joined forces in 2005 to forgive the debt of sub-Saharan states contingent on completion of certain reforms intended to reduce poverty, which mostly follow the liberal agenda of privatization, deregulation, and increased production without a focus on equity (Carrasco, McClellan, & Ro, 2007). This coercive policy presents the same problems as the structural adjustment programs that traded money for reform, and it strengthens the lethal grasp of liberalism on sub-Saharan states.

Liberalism's deadly hold on Africa is exacerbated by international norms. The first norm that I will analyze is the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) populations that face human rights violations. While this norm is rarely corroborated with force, it nonetheless dictates an international expectation that governments will treat their subjects with respect and protect their basic human rights. However, it is unrealistic to expect in the early stages of state-building that regimes will be both effective and humane (Ayoob, 1998: 44). The incompatibility of effectiveness and human rights protection is exemplified in Zakaria's observation that though most sub-Saharan states have gone through a wave of democratization, the freedom that Western society enjoys is largely removed from the African population (Zakaria, 1997: 26). The possibility of forming an effective government and enforcing human rights protections simultaneously is slim, as basic needs preempt freedom. In other words, liberty cannot coexist with a government that is incapable of providing basic services to its subjects, because the right to basic services are indeed a human liberty of its own. The international expectation that sub-Saharan states should be both effective and humane is detrimental to the region as it ignores the problematic contradiction between the two in the early stages of state-building and it also ignores the problematic population distribution throughout most of the continent which prevents African governments from extending basic services, let alone human rights, throughout its entire

territory. Without a quantitative decrease in state size, it is improbable that African regimes will be able to alter the predicament that R2P presents.

The other norm that I will assess – perhaps the only other widely accepted norm – is sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty is the most dangerous institution in regards to Africa, as it enforces the rigid state boundaries that have placed sub-Saharan Africa in its undesirable situation. This norm places primacy on the state as the only actor with authority to rule over its given territory, and it is the main reason that African leaders adopted and maintain their oversized colonial state boundaries. Of course, every ambitious leader would gladly bask in the glory of a larger-than-necessary territory, so it is not difficult to understand why most regimes are concerned with “staying in power rather than extending the power of their states” (Herbst, 2000: 253). This norm relates directly to Hegel's first law of the passage of quantitative into qualitative change, as a reduction in state size would lead a transition toward effective, liberal governance. Similarly, it would resolve the conflict of opposites between the need to keep the boundaries in order to preserve control and the lack of control due to the large boundaries. Though the norm of sovereignty is too engrained in the international community to dissolve in sub-Saharan Africa, it could certainly be curtailed in order to allow for effective political control over a smaller area.

In summary, international institutions in sub-Saharan Africa have proven mostly ineffective in alleviating the multitude of problems that plague Africa, because they worsen the problems which preclude the successful adoption of the liberal principles of capitalism and democratization across the continent. That is, due to the liberal nature of most international institutions, the most influential international governmental organizations and norms that operate within the confines of sub-Saharan Africa provide largely inappropriate responses to the troubles that capitalism and democratization pose throughout the region. The inadequacies of

international institutions in Africa have proven to be detrimental to the area, as they perpetuate the inability of Africa to complete the natural dialectical process of development that Hegel famously denotes.

Conclusion: The Future of Liberalism in Africa

The desperate economic and political situation in sub-Saharan Africa warrants a close analysis of its causes and solutions. In doing so, it is instructive to view African stability through the lens of Hegel's dialectical account of development, as it provides valuable and empirically validated insight into the shortcomings of liberalism throughout the world's most deprived continent.

Upon looking at Hegel's three laws of dialectical development in relation to the three principles of liberalism, one finds that sub-Saharan African states skipped steps in the dialectical process which prevented it from fully embracing and reaping the benefits of liberalism as Western states were able to do. Precisely, a growth in wealth was stifled by Europe beginning in precolonial times and extending to the present day, preventing Africa from making the quantitative change necessary to facilitate a successful transition to capitalism. The curtailment of the African economy also reinforced the contradiction between economic survival and dependence on the West, reinforcing Hegel's second law of the unity and conflict of opposites. In the realm of democratization, the colonial European state borders are too large to ensure effective democracy, let alone liberal democracy as seen in most Western states. Without a quantitative change in state size to assure that a state can extend its power over a region with a sparse and unevenly distributed population, a qualitative transition to democracy is unlikely to be adopted in the same efficient form that can be found in the West. Similarly, the contradiction between the desire for retention of state boundaries to maintain political control and the fact that the upholding of state boundaries prevents total political control contributes to the unsustainability of democracy, and indeed all forms of governance, in the sub-Saharan region. Finally, institutions worsen the situation by reinforcing capitalism and democracy in Africa but

doing little, if anything, to address the underlying problems that prevent their total embrace by African states.

Having skipped quantitative change and the resolution of contradictions in the dialectical account of development, we find that Hegel's third and final law, the negation of the negation – which has been neglected throughout most of this paper, as it cannot be observed in its proper form in Africa – needs to be carried out in order to facilitate a sustainable change in the power of Africa in the international scene. The adoption of capitalism, which negated feudalism, and liberal governance, which negated illiberal post-independence regimes, colonial occupation, and the variety of small-scale governance that characterized the precolonial period, was forced upon sub-Saharan Africa without the necessary and natural process of dialectical development that allows for those changes to be suitable for the region. Since the law of the negation of the negation is one in which two qualitative categories are sublated into a synthesized version of the two, it necessitates that capitalism be reconciled with feudalism and the liberal state with the governance forms of the past, with institutions accommodating this sublation rather than reinforcing capitalism and democratization; however, since Africa never underwent the entire process of dialectical development properly, the negation of the negation would prove as unsustainable for the sub-Saharan area as the three liberal principles that have failed it.

Thus, Africa finds itself in a struggle between tradition and modernity, between the past and the present. In order to complete Hegel's dialectical process of development to successfully embrace the three liberal principles that inspire world peace, it would have to experience a vast quantitative increase in wealth and quantitatively smaller states, both which facilitated Europe's eventual qualitative transition to liberalism, accompanied by institutional accommodation of whatever means are necessary to achieve these goals. So, Africa's two options are striving for

these quantitative changes to reach the nodal point at which a qualitative change occurs, or adopting new guiding principles outside the liberal framework.

Continually reaching for a quantitative increase in wealth is not a worthwhile endeavor, as African dependence on the West coupled with economic dictates by international institutions will preclude its success. Similarly, a reduction in state size is unlikely on account of the fact that the international community is intolerant of drastic changes to sovereign states, especially when it involves the creation of new states and the manipulation of state boundaries. So, what does this mean for sub-Saharan Africa?

Whether or not liberalism will instigate perpetual peace, it cannot be sustained in Africa. Its principles of capitalism, democratization, and institutionalization need to be abandoned and a return to a more traditional mode of economic and societal organization is necessary. With the negation of capitalism, it will be assured that the sub-Saharan African economy will not be indefinitely exploited as it has been since precolonial times, and the decrease in state size will allow governments to extend their powers to their entire populations and become both effective and humane. Furthermore, a rejection of liberal international institutions will ensure both that African dependence on the Western world is decreased and that it is not coerced to sustain the liberal principles that have failed the sub-Saharan region. Eventually, perhaps, Africa will experience the quantitative changes that should have happened earlier and make the successful transition to liberalism; but, if not, an immense amount of human suffering will nonetheless be alleviated.

The logistics of Africa's return to a more traditional form of economic and societal organization is of little concern to me. The purpose of this section is not to describe a new economic or political system that would better serve sub-Saharan Africa; rather, my purpose was

only to assert that liberalism is not performing its designated duties in the region. Upon completing the transition back to a more traditional society, sub-Saharan Africa will finally be able to stop hoping for improvement and resign itself from the waiting game that has for far too long agonized its people.

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